

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0577
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 08703

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY REPORT, JUNE 7, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO.232

1. SUMMARY: AT JUNE 7 PLENARY MEETING, US REP (WARNKE) PRESENTED US PROPOSAL FOR FIVE-YEAR DURATION OF CTB TREATY AND UK REP (EDMONDS) PUT FORWARD UK VIEWS ON FIVE-YEAR DURATION (TEXTS SEPTELS). IN INITIAL REACTION, SOVIET REP (PETROSYANTS) INDICATED SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER FIVE-YEAR DURATION AND URGED US AND UK TO BE FLEXIBLE ON VERIFICATION. PETROSYANTS WAS UPBEAT IN SUBSEQUENT HEADS OF DEL MEETING AND CHARACTERIZED THE US INITIATIVE ON DURATION AS "A TURNING POINT IN THE TALKS." END SUMMARY

2. WELCOMING PROGRESS IN WORKING GROUPS ON OSI AND RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, WARNKE SAID WORK ON SECRET

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NSS MUST ALSO BE EXPEDITED. THE US EXPECTED TO RECEIVE AND TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO OTHER DELS IN THE NEAR FUTURE DESIGN DRAWINGS FOR PROTOTYPE SEISMIC STATIONS.

3. WARNKE SAID THAT IN RECENT REVIEW OF QUESTION OF DURATION THE US HAD IN MIND SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR TERMINATION AFTER THREE YEARS, IF OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS HAD NOT

ADHERED, AND NEED TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND SOVIET APPROACHES WHICH INVOLVED BASIC PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. AFTER STUDY AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF IMPLICATIONS, THE PRESIDENT HAD AUTHORIZED WARNKE TO PROPOSE A TREATY WITH A FIXED DURATION OF FIVE YEARS. THE SAME PERIOD WOULD APPLY TO THE PNE PROTOCOL. THE TREATY WOULD PROVIDE FOR A MULTILATERAL REVIEW CONFERENCE IN THE FIFTH YEAR TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO NEGOTIATE A REPLACEMENT TREATY. THE NUCLEAR PARTIES WOULD CONSULT BEFORE THE CONFERENCE AND FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON TESTING WOULD REQUIRE THEIR CONSENSUS. THIS APPROACH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET IDEA OF UNITY OF ACTION. ANY FURTHER AGREEMENT ON TESTING LIMITATION WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE US SENATE FOR APPROVAL.

4. WARNKE SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO DIRECTED HIM TO STRESS HIS DESIRE THAT WORK BE EXPEDITED TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. WARNKE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT IN VIEW OF THE STEP THE US HAD TAKEN THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON REMAINING ISSUES AND ESPECIALLY ON VERIFICATION WHICH WAS CRUCIAL TO THE US.

5. RECALLING THAT DR. OWEN HAD BRIEFED GROMYKO IN NEW YORK REGARDING UK VIEWS, EDMONDS SAID THE UK BELIEVED THE BEST SOLUTION ON DURATION WOULD BE: (A) A MULTILATERAL CTB OF FIVE YEARS DURATION; (B) A CONFERENCE OF PARTIES IN THE
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FIFTH YEAR AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE TO DECIDE WHETHER SOME FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD FOLLOW AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD; (C) CONSULTATIONS AMONG NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE PARTIES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, A POINT THAT NEED NOT BE MENTIONED IN THE TREATY.

6. EDMONDS SAID THESE PROPOSALS TOOK ACCOUNT OF SOVIET POSITIONS INCLUDING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A TREATY LIMITED TO THREE YEARS AND THE SOVIET WISH FOR UNITY OF ACTION BY THE THREE NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. THE UK HAD ALSO SOUGHT TO MEET SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. NOTING THE NEED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY HOW TO PRESENT THE TRIPARTITE CONCLUSIONS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD, EDMONDS EXPRESSED HOPE FOR A MAJOR EFFORT TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND TO PRODUCE AN EARLY CTB AGREEMENT.

7. PETROSYANTS SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE UK AND US STATEMENTS AND PROVIDE AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HIS PRELIMINARY REACTION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS COULD IN PRINCIPLE CONSIDER A FIVE-YEAR TREATY PROVIDED THE US AND UK TOOK A POSITIVE APPROACH TO REMAIN-

ING PROBLEMS AND PARTICULARLY VERIFICATION. PETROSYANTS SAID GROMYKO'S COMMENTS IN THE SSOD REGARDING EARLY COMPLETION AND SIGNATURE OF A CTB CORRESPONDED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENTS AND THOSE OF THE US AND UK DELS. BUT TO SUCCEED, PRACTICAL WAYS WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND TO SOLVE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO EXAMINE WHETHER SOME PROPOSALS CONTAINED EXCESSIVELY COMPLICATED ASPECTS OR ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS TO PROGRESS. IN APPARENT ALLUSION TO NSS, PETROSYANTS SAID THERE WERE SUCH PROPOSALS, AND HE EMPHASIZED SOVIET DESIRE TO

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EXPEDITE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. IN HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING FOLLOWING THE PLENARY, PETROSYANTS DISPLAYED UPBEAT ATTITUDE TOWARD US INITIATIVE ON DURATION, SAYING TWICE THAT WE HAD JUST HAD AN "HISTORIC" MEETING, CHARACTERIZING IT AS "A TURNING POINT IN THE TALKS", AND CALLING THE US MOVE A "DEFINITE STEP FORWARD." HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING CONDUCTED ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, WITH "NO ONE PUSHING US". WE WOULD NOT BE PURSUING THIS NEGOTIATION IF WE DID NOT INTEND TO STOP TESTING -- AND THAT MEANT WE SHOULD BE REALISTIC ABOUT VERIFICATION. THE SOVS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO VERIFICATION; INDEED, WE WERE ALREADY NEGOTIATING VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AND MAKING CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS REGARDING INITIATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. BUT

THE SOVIETS WERE AGAINST SEEKING VERIFICATION WHICH WAS
OVERLY-COMPLICATED. WARNKE EXPLAINED WHY IT WAS VERY
IMPORTANT TO HAVE GOOD VERIFICATION WITH A FIVE-YEAR CTB.
THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF UNCERTAINTIES AS TO WHETHER IT
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WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE LIMITATIONS ON TESTING AFTER
THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. ONE OF THESE WOULD BE WHETHER THERE
HAD BEEN ADEQUATE MEANS OF ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE THROUGH
VERIFICATION SO THAT POSSIBLE CHARGES OF VIOLATION, WHICH
WERE ALWAYS A RISK, COULD BE SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED
AND SO THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE A FAVORABLE ELEMENT IN
OUR RELATIONS. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH PETROSYANTS
EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT, ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO GENEVA,
WARNKE WOULD AGAIN BRING WITH HIM DECISIONS AS POSITIVE
FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE US MOVE ON DURATION. JOHNSON

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